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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem for discussion 
The emergence of cybercrime poses new challenges for law enforcement authorities. 
New technology makes it possible to commit crimes from anywhere to anywhere in the 
world at any time. It enables new types of crime1 as well as the commission of 
traditional crimes by means of information technology.  The consequences of criminal 
behavior can be more far-reaching than before because they are not restricted by 
geographical limitations or national boundaries.2 Countries worldwide need to reach a 
consensus as to which computer and technology-related activities should be 
criminalized, and international cooperation is essential when it comes to combating 
cybercrime.  
The Council of Europe has passed the Cybercrime Convention3 as a first step to 
harmonize countries’ computer crime laws. It is the first legally binding multilateral 
instrument drafted specifically to address the problems posed by the spread of criminal 
activity in computer networks.  
                                                 
1 For example, hacking, virus and denial of service attacks  
2 Council of Europe - Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185), hereinafter 
referred to as the Explanatory Report (para 5) 
3 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185), hereinafter referred to as the Cybercrime 
Convention  
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The Convention defines a minimum level of cybercrime offences to be recognized in 
national laws, and aims to provide the necessary criminal procedural law powers to 
investigate and prosecute offences committed with the aid of computer technology.  
From a law enforcements perspective, traditional methods for investigations will often 
be insufficient in cyberspace. There are usually no fingerprints, witnesses or physical 
evidence of the offence. Instead there will be evidence like “electronic trails" leading 
from the victim back to the perpetrator.  Such trails may consist of computer data. 
Examples are recipients and duration of calls, electronic transactions, web sites visited, 
storage of illegal content, etc.   
To ensure that traditional methods of search and seizure remain effective in a volatile 
technological environment,4 the Cybercrime Convention provides for the expedited 
preservation of computer data.5  This enables law enforcement authorities6 to request 
that computer data are preserved and protected from anything that could alter or destroy 
the data while an investigation is ongoing. To preserve data means to keep data, which 
already exists in a stored form, protected from anything that would cause its current 
quality or condition to deteriorate.7 This applies in practice only to reasonable small 
amounts of specified data identified as relevant in a particular case. 
                                                 
4 Explanatory Report para 134 
5 The Cybercrime Convention, Chapter 2 Section 2 Title 2 
6 E.g., the police, internal security agencies, criminal investigation units and others 
7 G8 Government-Private Sector High-Level Meeting On High-Tech Crime, Report for Workshop 1: Data 
Retention Potential Consequences for Data Retention of Various Business Models Characterizing Internet 
Service Providers, Tokyo, 22-24 May, 2001, hereinafter referred to as the G8 Report, available at 
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/high_tec/conf0105-4.thml (accessed 25 July 2003) 
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The police are often dependant of information from service providers8 to follow such 
electronic trails.9 However, service providers store data by different means, and for 
variable periods of time. Some service providers do not log any traffic data at all.  
Sometimes the crime is not discovered right away; it may take weeks, months or even 
years, for the victim to realize that he has been the target of a crime.  
In the mean time, data protection laws may have affirmatively required the destruction 
of important data before anyone realized its significance for criminal proceedings.10 
Law enforcement authorities therefore demand data retention for a certain fixed period 
of time. “Data retention” would require service providers to collect and keep data as a 
routine matter, such as traffic data or content data related to future communications.  
The Cybercrime Convention does not address such requirements, but some countries 
have already passed national laws with such requirements.11  
This has caused reactions from data protection authorities12 and privacy interest 
groups.13 They recognize that law enforcement authorities have a legitimate need to 
investigate crimes, but fear that the extensive collection and use of data will jeopardize 
the protection of personal data and the right to anonymity.  
                                                 
8 Generic term for companies that provides access to electronic communication, i.e. phone companies, 
mobile operators and Internet Service Providers 
9 Inger Marie Sunde, “IKT-kriminalitet: Etterforskningsmetoder og personvern”, n.d., available at 
http://www.okokrim.no (accessed 25 July 2003)   
10 Explanatory Report para 150 
11 Examples are Denmark and UK, see further section 7.1 below   
12 E.g., the European Data Protection Commissioners (EDPC)  
13 E.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), see www.epic.org and Global Internet Liberty 
Campaign, see www.gilc.org for further information (accessed 25 July 2003)   
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They claim that data retention requirements will deprive citizens of their privacy rights, 
and warns about the unknown effects and potential misuse of extensive surveillance.14  
It has been claimed that data retention conflicts with fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, such as Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The Article 
protects every individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities in private or 
family life, including correspondence. Exemptions may be made for prevention of crime 
or national security, but any interference or measure must be justifiable and 
proportionate to the purpose it serves. Any requirement for data retention must therefore 
fulfill certain conditions, and be worth the privacy costs.  
If mandatory data storage requirements are introduced, it will directly affect the service 
provider industry. For the service providers who are required to store the information, 
the concerns are primarily those of feasibility, practicability and cost. High costs could 
harm the development of the information society by affecting end-user prices, and the 
collection and retention of personal information erodes consumers’ confidence in doing 
business on the Internet due to privacy concerns.15 
This thesis will analyze the Cybercrime Convention’s provisions of data preservation 
and discuss whether they are appropriate and proportional to the purposes they serve, or 
if data retention should be mandatory.  
                                                 
14 Statewatch, “Surveillance of Communications: data retention to be ‘compulsory’ for 12-24 months”, 
No 11, May 2002, available at www.statewatch.org/neww/2002/aug/05datafd1.htm (accessed 25 July 
2003)  
15 G8 Report  
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1.2 Scope of Thesis 
The new Cybercrime Convention is used as primary point of reference because it is the 
first legally binding multilateral instrument in the area of criminal laws. This is an area 
that traditionally has been outside the scope of EU law, and national legislation contain 
significant gaps and differences which could act as an barrier to effective police and 
judicial co-operation in the fight against organized crime and terrorism. There is a lot of 
interest attached to how and to what extent the Convention will aid the harmonization of 
criminal laws, as this is vital to identify perpetrators of computer-related offences and 
bring them to justice. There is some uncertainty connected to what the actual 
requirements of the Cybercrime Convention are, and how the measures will be 
implemented in national laws.  
The storage of different types of communications data (“traffic data”) for business 
purposes and law enforcement purposes is increasingly regulated in national laws due to 
data protection- and anti-terrorism laws. However, divergence exists between different 
countries’ laws. This is not the ideal situation for law enforcement, as the police work 
may be hampered because of variation in collection routines and procedures.  
Articles 16 and 17 of the Cybercrime Convention – Expedited preservation of stored 
computer data – ensures that electronic evidence will be available in a certain period of 
time while investigation is ongoing. The subject for discussion is whether these 
provisions are an appropriate measure, or if they should be expanded to include data 
retention.  
The central aim is to cast light on the ongoing debate in Europe, including 1) how 
suitable the different measures will be for law enforcement purposes, 2) how they affect 
privacy protection requirements, and 3) what effect they will have on the industry itself, 
and the development of the information society.   
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There are a number of important issues that will fall outside the scope of this thesis.  
Substantive law issues will not be covered. Neither will the real time interception of 
traffic data or search and seizure is an online environment. Furthermore, international 
cooperation will only be discussed in relation to the preservation-requirements.  
The aim is not to present an extensive overview of all possible legal issues relation to 
the new requirements of data preservation, but rather highlight some important issues in 
the ongoing debate in relation to implementing the provisions of the Convention in 
national laws.   
1.3 Source material and Method 
The primary source of material is the Cybercrime Convention and its preparatory works. 
In 1989, the CoE published a study and recommendations addressing the need for new 
substantive laws criminalizing certain conduct committed through computer networks 
(Recommendation No. R. (89) 9). This was followed by a second study, published in 
1995, which contained principles concerning the adequacy of criminal procedural laws 
in this area (Recommendation No. R. (95) 13). Building on the principles developed in 
the 1989 and 1995 reports, in 1997, the CoE established a Committee of Experts on 
Crime in Cyber-space (PC-CY). The new Committee was given the task of drafting a 
“binding legal instrument” dealing with cybercrime, with particular emphasis on 
international issues.16 The preparation of the Convention was a long process; it took 
four years and twenty-seven drafts before the final version was submitted. 
The area of criminal laws are traditionally not very harmonized, so it is difficult to 
predict how national variations in legislation will affect the implementation of the 
Convention.  
                                                 
16 Explanatory Report para 11 
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It appears to be little literature available on how the different articles are to be 
understood at the time being. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Convention is used 
to some degree to interprete the different requirements of Articles 16 and 17.  
The two articles are examined to what extent they will be able to fulfill their aim, i.e. 
whether preservation requirements are sufficient for crime investigation, or if there is 
need to make data retention mandatory 
Data retention requirements raise different concerns regarding privacy, and the retention 
requirements are analyzed to existing legislation in the privacy field. The analysis is 
limited to the data protection directives within EU, and Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Literatures regarding data protection and human rights 
have been important for the discussion of privacy issues in relation to any data 
preservation or –retention requirements.  
Important sources of material are different articles and reports on the ongoing 
discussion whether data retention should be mandatory.  
To highlight the views of the different interest at stake, common statements from 
different interest groups are cited. Among these are common statements from European 
law enforcement authorities and data protection authorities, and also common 
statements from the industry of service providers. 
The data preservation- and retention requirements are briefly discussed in relation to the 
E-commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC), and what impact such requirements will 
have on the development of the information society.  
1.4 Further presentation 
Some background material, such as the use of computer data in criminal investigations, 
is provided in Chapter 2 below. Chapter 3 gives an outline of the Cybercrime 
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Convention and a presentation of the requirements of expedited preservation and –
disclosure of data. Chapter 4 discusses whether preservation requirements are sufficient 
for crime investigation, or if there is need to make data retention mandatory.  Chapter 5 
analyses the different requirements in relation to privacy laws, particular the European 
Human Rights Convention Article 8 and the European data protection directives. 
Chapter 6 compares the Cybercrime Convention’s preservation requirements to the 
provisions of Directive 2000/31/EC (e-commerce directive). Chapter 7 gives a short 
summary over current status in Europe and the United States. Chapter 8 lists some of 
the most imporant discussion topics yet unanswered, and attempts to suggest some 
possible solutions. Chapter 9 contains some final remarks and conclusions.  
2 Some background material 
2.1 Tracing computer crimes17  
Traces and evidence of criminal behaviour online will usually exist, if the police know 
where to look. Computer networks and service providers will usually keep track of 
certain types of information, such as traffic data, authorized and unauthorized access 
attempts, web sites visited etc. Most important to trace a criminal is probably traffic 
data, which usually contains an identifier as a telephone number or an IP address (see 
section 2.3 below).  
                                                 
17 See, e.g. Daniel Morris, “Tracking a Computer Hacker”, n.d., available at www.cybercrime.gov 
(accessed 25 July 2003), Inger Marie Sunde, “IKT-kriminalitet: Etterforskningsmetoder og personvern”, 
and James K. Robinson, "Internet as the Scene of Crime" speech at the International Computer Crime 
Conference, Oslo, Norway, May 29-31, 2000, available at www.cybercrime.gov (accessed 25 July 2003) 
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But, several challenges exist that may hinder law enforcement’s ability to trace 
criminals operating online. Criminals may hide or "spoof"18 their Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses, or use offshore systems such as satellite phones and foreign web-based e-
mail services. The use of anonymous communication services leaves the police without 
any traces at all.  
Computer criminals are often highly skilled (and in some cases, well funded), and have 
in-depth knowledge of the latest technology. This means law enforcement need to have 
equally expertise and resources to keep up with the criminals, and successfully 
investigate and prosecute cybercrime.   
2.2 Computer data 
Computer data has been defined and categorized in a number of ways. In this thesis, the 
term will be used of the logging information held by service providers, such as phone 
calls, web sites visited, e-mails and location from where a person has called. Computer 
data will cover (at least) the following three types of data:  
Traffic data is any data processed in the course of or for the purpose of the 
transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network. This can 
be anything from subscriber information, time and duration of calls, recipient 
information etc. Sometimes location data (see below) are included in the definition of 
traffic data, and sometimes subscriber data is defined separately as name and address of 
the user/ subscriber, or any information available (e.g., birth date).  
                                                 
18 To deceive for the purpose of gaining access to someone else's resources (for example, to fake an 
Internet address so that one looks like someone else) 
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Location data is where a person is when calling, i.e. the geographic position of mobile 
users or terminal equipment.19 This information is necessary to enable the transmission 
of communication from and to a user without a fixed location, e.g. cellular or satellite 
networks. Precise location could be useful for e.g. emergency services to be able to send 
assistance or rescue teams to the person calling, but in this context location data is used 
as an illustration of the potential to generate a clear description of geographical 
movements of the user.  
Content data can be defined as the information transmitted, such as a conversation (for 
phone calls), e-mails, file transfers etc. The content of an e-mail could be compared to a 
letter: the recipients- and senders address would equal traffic data, and the letter itself 
would equal the content data.20  
Giving the fast evolving technology and services, it’s impossible to give a complete list 
and qualification of data. An example of some communications data, given by the G8,21 
is provided in Annex I.  
2.3 IP addresses  
Another type of computer data is Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. 22  Every computer 
needs an IP address to communicate across the Internet. Each computer is assigned a 
                                                 
19 IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) codes identifies GSM mobile equipment, SIM cards 
are identified by IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) codes 
20 Content data will be discussed further below in section 2.7 and section 8.2.1 
21 G8 is an international cooperation between France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, 
Japan, Italy and Canada 
22 See further Roger Clarke, “A Primer on Internet Technology”, Version of 15 February 1998, Additional 
material, Masters of Law (Oslo: NRCCL, 2003) 
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unique address somewhat similar to a street address or telephone number.23 Generally, 
users who have fixed Internet connections (cable modems, private companies etc.) have 
fixed IP addresses. Dial-up Internet providers usually give addresses dynamically from 
a pool when a user dials in to connect. By searching IP registration databases it is 
possible to determine who owns an IP address block. 24  Once the network owner is 
located, the service provider can be contacted for user- and subscriber list for 
establishing the identity of the person who used the particular IP address at that 
particular time.25  
2.4 The role of Service providers  
Service providers act as junctions in Internet communications, and possess a lot of 
information about users, subscriber information and traffic data. Such information is 
valuable for the police, and service providers therefore have a vital role in the fight 
against cybercrime.  
The term “service provider” is defined in Article 1c of the Cybercrime Convention as   
“any public or private entity that provides to users its service the ability to communicate 
by the means of a computer”, and “any other entity that processes or stores computer 
data on behalf of such communication service or users of such service”.   
The most common known service providers are the phone companies, mobile operators 
and Internet service providers. However, a there is a wide range of different providers: 
                                                 
23 Under the current system there are four numbers that range from 0 to 255 (example: 86.214.80.63) 
24 IP addresses are distributed in blocks to network providers or private companies. Once an IP address is 
captured several methods can be used to trace the user. See example of tools to trace users at 
http://network-tools.com/ (accessed 25 July 2003)       
25 Sophisticated computer break-ins sometimes include an attempt to erase the IP addresses captured by 
the log files to prevent this type of lookup 
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small and larger-scale businesses, national and multinational mobile telephony 
companies, Internet cafés, broadband connections, universities, airports and hotels, free, 
anonymous/ pseudonymous services etc. The wording “any public or private entity that 
provides…ability to communicate...” will subsume all of the above under the definition 
of a service provider, and data retention requirements would apply to all of them.  
2.5 Data storage 
The collection, registration and storage of data will vary substantially between the 
different types of service providers.  Some service providers need to know more about 
their users for billing purposes, such as telephone companies that charge different tariffs 
for their services (e.g., different tariffs for local- and international calls, or different 
tariffs depending on what time of day it is). Service providers that are based on dial-up 
access for their users need to record log in and –out for billing. This is not necessary for 
service providers that offer a flat rate service.26   
The volume, technical specifications and costs of storage vary between the different 
business models. The different service providers use significant different systems for 
data storage. Unfortunately, it was not possible to present a general overview over 
technical storage methods, as this would go way beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Concomitantly, the conclusion is that storage methods vary between different service 
providers. The costs of retaining certain data items under certain models could be fairly 
low; the same data under different models quite high.27 
                                                 
26 EU Forum on Cybercrime, Discussion Paper for Expert’s meeting on Retention of Traffic Data, 6 
November 2001 (informal working paper prepared by the Commission services), p. 1, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topic/telecoms/internet/crime/wpap1ov/index_en.htm (accessed 
25 July 2003)  
27 See further section 8.3.1 below 
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2.6 Access to stored data  
Law enforcement authorities generally have sufficient powers to search and seize 
relevant materials, subject to restrictions on obtaining certain types of data.28 To my 
knowledge, no reports exist of how many computer-related crimes that are solved 
directly from access to traffic data – or on the other hand, how many cases that remains 
unsolved because there are no traffic data available. 
However, there are a few reports of requests from law enforcement authorities to service 
providers regarding access to traffic data.  In UK, it is estimated that 1 million requests 
are being made to telephone companies for information. Law enforcement authorities 
are also requesting information from Internet service providers, but not in such large 
quantities.29 In Norway, no reliable statistics are available but law enforcement 
authorities estimate “a few hundred” each year.30  
The data most often requested by law enforcement authorities are the name and address 
associated with a screen name and to a lesser extent the identification of a subscriber by 
an IP address.31  
2.7 Is there a difference between traffic and content data? 
Some will claim that there is an artificial distinction between traffic and content data. It 
has been stated that this is an “old-fashioned” distinction, based on old technology 
                                                 
28 For access to communication data in Norway, see Fuhr, Ringdal & Mørkved: “Etterforskning av 
telekommunikasjon: Loven krever fritak fra taushetsplikten”, published in Juristkontakt 2/2003 
29 All Party Internet Group (AGIP), “Communication Data: Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Group”, 
January 2003, available at http://www.apig.org.uk/AGIPreport.pdf  (accessed 25 July 2003)   
30 Økokrim, July 2003 
31 Rainer Allitsch, “Data Retention on the Internet – A measure with one foot offside?” CRI 6/2002, p. 
162 
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where the only means of telecommunication was the telephone.32 Today’s 
communication technologies33 carry voice, sound, video and huge volumes of 
information data. A person can do several things simultaneously: browse several web 
sites, send mails, download music etc.  The information revealed from this type of 
communication is likely to be more revealing and sensitive than a phone number called, 
for example a header containing the URL of website(s) visited or the subject line of an 
e-mail. Because such “navigation data” show which pages on a website have been 
visited, they could reveal the actual content of an individual’s communication and 
thereby his or hers’ personal interests (e.g. political opinions, religious beliefs, health or 
sex life).  
3 CoE Cybercrime Convention 
3.1 Introduction 
The Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime (ETS No. 185) is, as mentioned 
above, the first legally binding multilateral instrument drafted specifically to address the 
problems posed by the spread of criminal activity in computer networks.  The 
Convention aims to reach a minimum level of substantive and procedural provisions in 
the field of criminal law, and to supplement already existing multilateral and bilateral 
                                                 
32 Allitsch, p. 164 
33 Communications is accomplished by sending pieces of information called “packets” that include the IP 
address of the destination computer, the URL of a website or the heading of an e-mail, etc. (packet-
switched technology) 
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agreements between signatory Member States.34 It is not only an agreement between 
European states; the intention is to enable the largest possible number of States to 
become Parties.35 
Cybercrime can be distinguished in two categories; traditional crimes committed with 
the aid of computer technology, and new computer specific crimes (i.e. illegal access to 
computer networks, virus attacks etc). As for the latter, the Convention defines a set of 
substantive laws that are to be recognized in national laws. The procedural provisions 
will apply to any offence committed by means of a computer system,36 irrespective of 
the nature of the criminal offence. 
The Convention is not self-executing, but obliges Contracting Parties to incorporate the 
Convention’s principles into domestic legislation. The Convention is thus typical of the 
way multilateral law enforcement conventions are drafted. Most substantive and 
procedural provisions start with “Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary…” It is anticipated that parties will fulfill their 
international obligations consistent with their particular domestic legal systems.  
The Convention sets out for minimum standards, and thereby creates a significant 
leeway for the Member States when incorporating the Convention in national laws. 
Moreover, Parties are allowed to make significant derogations37 and reservations.38 
Important issues are left to definition in national law, such as how to obtain expedited 
                                                 
34 See, for example, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No 30) and 
the European Convention on Extradition (ETS No 24), cf. CoE Cybercrime Convention Art 39 
35 Explanatory Report para 304, 316 
36 Explanatory Report para 19 
37 See, for example, Articles 21(2) and 29(4) 
38 Article 42 
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preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data when more than one service provider 
is involved in the communication. 
Many of the provisions are diffuse with little authoritative guidance on how they are to 
be interpreted. The Convention has been issued with an Explanatory Report prefaced 
with a disclaimer stating, “The text of this Explanatory Report does not constitute an 
instrument providing an authoritative interpretation of the Convention, although it might 
be of such a nature as to facilitate the application of the provisions contained therein”. 
Caution therefore needs to be exercised when using the Explanatory Report to interpret 
the provisions of the Convention.  
The Convention does not mandate any particular body to ensure its implementation in 
national laws. This raises the question what happens if a contracting Party does not 
implement the necessary measures, or within a given time period. Can a citizen in a 
contracting Party call upon the Articles in the Convention when the time limit for 
implementation is due? If the answer is yes, the Convention will have a direct binding 
effect on the contracting Parties. This is probably not the intention, though, since the 
Convention allows a number of reservations and derogations, which is explained by 
“the fact that the Convention covers area of criminal law and criminal procedural law 
which is relatively new to many States”, Explanatory Report para 320. Thus, the main 
sanction for not conforming to the requirements would probably be the political 
pressure from other Parties to implement the principles of the Convention in national 
law.  
Article 43 authorizes the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to periodically 
enquire about the prospect for withdrawal, in order to maintain some pressure on the 
Parties and to make them at least consider withdrawing their reservations.39  
                                                 
39 Explanatory Report para 322 
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Article 46 provides for the consultations of the Parties for the purpose of facilitating the 
effective use and implementation of the Convention by the Parties.  
3.2 Signatory and Ratification 
As of 25 July 2003, the Convention has not entered into force. It has currently been 
signed by 30 of 44 member states of the Council of Europe, and by 4 non-CoE member 
states - United States, Canada, Japan and South Africa.40 The Convention will enter into 
force when 5 ratifications, acceptances or approvals are received. This figure is higher 
than the usual threshold (3) in Council of Europe treaties and reflects the belief that a 
slightly larger group is needed to successfully begin addressing the challenge of 
international computer- or computer-related crime.41 So far, 3 CoE States have ratified 
the Convention.42 43 
The Convention is open for ratification by States that are not members of the CoE 
(Article 36). Once the Convention enters into force, other non-member States may be 
invited to accede to the Convention in conformity with Article 37, paragraph 1.44 
Invitation of others requires the unanimous consent of the contracting Parties.   
                                                 
40 Status by 25 July 2003  
41 Explanatory Report para 305 
42 Albania, Croatia and Estonia (status by 25 July 2003) 
43 In Norway, the government has appointed a working party to evaluate necessary changes in existing 
legislation prior to the implementation of the Cybercrime Convention. The working party has submitted 
its first report in June 2003, and the second report is expected autumn 2003. The first report is not public 
yet (as of June 2003), but it is expected that Norway will have to pass some new legislation to conform 
with the requirements of the Convention (Økokrim, June 2003). 
44 Explanatory Report para 304 
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3.3 Main lines of the Convention  
The Convention aims principally at (1) harmonizing the domestic criminal substantive 
law elements of offences and connected provisions in the area of cyber-crime (2) 
providing for domestic criminal procedural law powers necessary for the investigation 
and prosecution of such offences committed by means of a computer system or 
evidence in relation to which is in electronic form (3) setting up a fast and effective 
regime of international cooperation.45 The Preamble of the Convention explains the 
purposes for drafting the Convention and the goals it intends to achieve; Chapter I 
determines the terms used; Chapter II specifies the measures to be taken at the national 
level; Chapter III addresses international co-operation and Chapter IV deals with 
administrative matters. 
3.3.1 Offences listed 
Section 1 of Chapter II (substantive law issues) covers both criminalization provisions 
and other connected provisions in the area of computer- or computer-related crime. 
Dual criminality is often requested in mutual assistance matters, i.e. that the conduct 
under investigation is a crime in both the requesting and requested countries and is 
punishable. It is therefore necessary to ensure a minimum of substantial provisions to be 
recognized in national laws. When one country’s law criminalizes computer-related 
crime and another country’s laws do not, cooperation to solve a crime may not be 
possible. 
The Convention first defines 9 offences grouped in 4 different categories, and then deals 
with ancillary liability and sanctions. The following offences are defined by the 
Convention: illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, 
                                                 
45 Explanatory Report para 16 
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misuse of devices, computer-related forgery, computer-related fraud, offences related to 
child pornography and offences related to copyright and neighboring rights.46  An 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of 
acts of a racist or xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (ETS 189) 
has been drawn up, because it was not possible to reach consensus on the 
criminalization of such conduct within the Convention itself.47 
3.3.2 Procedural law 
In addition to substantial law statutes, appropriate procedural law provisions are 
necessary to investigate computer-related crime, both at the national level and 
internationally. Section 2 of Chapter II (procedural law issues) determines first the 
common conditions and safeguards, applicable to all procedural powers in this Chapter. 
The safeguards ensure the compliance with the principle of proportionality and with 
adequate protection of human rights and liberties (see further below, section 3.4.2), then 
sets out the following procedural powers: expedited preservation of stored data; 
expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data; production order; search 
and seizure of computer data; real-time collection of traffic data and interception of 
content data. Data preservation is a new legal power for most countries, 48 and will be 
dealt with in further detail below.  
3.3.3 International co-operation 
Since computer-related crimes may be committed from anywhere, or criminals may use 
service providers in different countries to hide their tracks, international police and 
                                                 
46 Explanatory Report para 18 
47 See Explanatory Report to Additional Protocol (ETS 189) para 4  
48 Explanatory Report para 155 
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judicial co-operation is often required. In addition to the traditional forms of 
international cooperation, covered by such texts as the European conventions on 
extradition and on mutual assistance in criminal matters,49 the Cybercrime Convention 
will enable law enforcement authorities in one country to collect computer-based 
evidence for police in another. However, law enforcement authorities may not conduct 
transborder investigations or searches. The Convention aims for international co-
operation to “the widest extent possible”.50 One of the most important new measures is 
the establishment of a 24/7 contact network, operating round the clock and seven days a 
week, to provide immediate assistance with current investigations.51  
3.3.4 Jurisdiction 
The transnational nature of many communications network raises complex issues 
relating to the exercise of law enforcement powers across multiple sovereign 
jurisdictions. While cybercrime may be global in nature, national boundaries exist for 
law enforcement. In the case of crimes committed by use of computer systems, there 
will be occasions in which more than one country has jurisdiction over some or all of 
the participants in the crime.52 Concepts like “place of origin”, “where the harm 
occurred” and “closest connection” may be difficult to determine. The participating 
countries must establish jurisdiction for any computer-related crime committed on their 
territory, or by their nationals. The aim is to avoid cybercrime havens. Article 22 
explicit lists that contracting Parties need to establish jurisdiction on board of ships or 
                                                 
49 The European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature in Paris, on 13 December 1957 (ETS 
No. 24) and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature in 
Strasbourg, on 20 April 1959 (ETS No. 30) 
50 Article 23 
51 See Article 35 of the Convention, and further the Explanatory Report para 298-302 
52 Explanatory Report para 239 
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aircraft under their laws. The reason is probably to avoid “virtual countries” that are 
created on ships or on aircrafts constantly moving through networks and outside any 
country’s jurisdiction.  
3.3.5 Participating countries 
The CoE’s member states drafted the text together with Canada, USA, Japan and South 
Africa. Because the provisions in the Convention at the drafting stage generally were 
adopted by consensus rather than by member state vote, the non-CoE member states had 
a real voice in the drafting process. By virtue of their having participated in the 
Convention’s elaboration, the countries mentioned also automatically had the right to 
become parties to the Convention. 
3.4 Procedural powers  
3.4.1 General  
Chapter 2 Title 2 of the Convention provides for the expedited preservation of stored 
computer data and partial disclosure of traffic data. Expedited preservation of data 
ensures that traditional measures for collection of evidence, such as search and seizure, 
remain effective in a constantly changing technological environment.53 With a few 
keystrokes, or by operation of automatic programs, evidence may be deleted, altered or 
moved, rendering it impossible to trace a crime to its perpetrator or destroying critical 
proof of guilt.54 The Convention requires signatory countries to enable law enforcement 
authorities to request preservation of already identified data, on a case-by case basis. 
                                                 
53 Explanatory report para 134 
54 Explanatory Report para 282 
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Preservation of data is not a new idea; it has been in the law of for example the United 
States for several years. 18. U.S.C. 2703 (f)55 requires an electronic service provider to 
“take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession 
pending an issuance of a court order or other process” upon “the request of a 
governmental entity.” This applies in practice only to reasonable small amounts of 
specified data identified as relevant to a particular case where the service provider 
already has control over that data.  
There are no requirements in the Convention for service providers to collect data that 
has not yet come into existence; neither does the Convention require any particular 
architecture or capability to be in place. In other words, the Convention does not expect 
a service provider to be able to obtain evidence that it is not technically capable of 
collecting.  
The drafters of the Cybercrime Convention discussed whether the Convention should 
impose an obligation for service providers to routinely collect and retain data for a 
certain fixed period of time, but did not include any such obligation due to lack of 
consensus.56  
However, while there are no mandatory technical retention requirements placed upon 
service providers, contracting Parties may impose such obligations under their legal 
system. As will be shown in Chapter 7, several EU member states have passed 
legislation that makes data retention mandatory.  
                                                 
55 Full text available on http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2703.htm, (accessed 25 July 2003)  
56 Explanatory Report para 135 
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3.4.2 Conditions and safeguards 
Articles 14 and 15 contain important instructions on the scope of procedural provisions 
and what conditions and safeguards must be in place. Legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish in national laws are subject to, and shall be in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality (Article 14), and shall provide adequate protection 
of human rights and liberties (Article 15). The principle of proportionality is central in 
EU law.57 Any interference of rights, responsibilities and interests of individuals or third 
parties, must be justifiable and proportionate to the purposes served. Applied to crime 
investigation, it means that any interference of such rights must be proportional to the 
nature and circumstances of the offence, with consideration of public safety on the one 
hand and the protection of the individual on the other.  
3.4.3 Definition of terms 
Article 1 provides the definition of a few of the terms used in the Convention. Important 
to note, the definitions are very broad. E.g., “computer data” is defined in Article 1(c) of 
the Convention as “any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form 
suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program suitable to cause a 
computer system to perform a function”.58 This definition would cover all types of data 
as described in section 2.2 above. 
“Traffic data” may be subsumed under the definition of computer data, but has a 
separate definition as “any computer data relating to a communication by means of a 
computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the 
                                                 
57 See further Takis Trimidas, The General Principles of EC Law, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1999)  
58 The Explanatory Report para 25 adds that the definition of computer data builds upon the ISO-
definition of data. This definition contains the term, “suitable for processing”.  
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communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of 
underlying service”.  
The definition of “Service provider” is already discussed in section 2.4 above.  
3.5 Article 16 - Expedited preservation of stored computer data 
The scope of Article 16 is to ensure that national competent authorities are able to order 
or similarly obtain stored computer data, before they are destroyed, in connection with a 
specific criminal investigation or proceeding.59 The Article applies at national level; see 
section 3.8 below for measures at the international level.   
Article 16 reads: 
 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to enable its competent authorities to order or similarly obtain the 
expeditious preservation of specified computer data, including traffic data, that 
has been stored by means of a computer system, in particular where there are 
grounds to believe that the computer data is particularly vulnerable to loss or 
modification. 
 2 Where a Party gives effect to paragraph 1 above by means of an order to a 
person to preserve specified stored computer data in the person’s possession or 
control, the Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to oblige that person to preserve and maintain the integrity of that 
computer data for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of 
ninety days, to enable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure. A Party 
may provide for such an order to be subsequently renewed. 
 3 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to oblige the custodian or other person who is to preserve the computer 
data to keep confidential the undertaking of such procedures for the period of 
time provided for by its domestic law. 
 4 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to 
Articles 14 and 15. 
                                                 
59 Explanatory Report para 158 
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According to Article 14, all the powers and procedures required to be established in 
Section 2 of the Convention are “for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or 
proceedings”, which limits the application of the measures to an investigation in a 
particular case. The preservation requirement applies in practice only to reasonable 
small amounts of specified data identified as relevant in a particular case. 
3.5.1 “Preservation” 
The term “preservation” is not defined in the Convention.60 Neither does the 
Convention give any guidance on how the preservation is supposed to be carried out, 
and leaves it for national legislation to specify technical means. Article 16(2) provide 
for measures to “maintain the integrity”. This would probably keep it safe from any risk 
of destruction of the data. Preservation would further imply measures to ensure the 
confidentiality (se further section 3.5.5 below) and integrity of the data. 
3.5.2 “Expedited” 
The Convention provides for “expedited” preservation (Article 16) and disclosure 
(Article 17). The term is not defined, but could in my opinion be understood as “without 
undue delay”.61 This interpretation is supported by the reference to “in particular where 
there are grounds to believe that the computer data is particular vulnerable to loss or 
modification”, Article 16(1), i.e. when there is a need for a quick response.   
                                                 
60 See Section 1.1 for the definition of “preservation” posed by the G8 Report 
61 Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) comments in that this could mean that data was 
shipped abroad only few minutes after it was collected, “Communication Data: Report of an Inquiry by 
the All Party Group (AGIP)”, January 2003 (para 194). See www.fipr.org and http://www.apig.org.uk/ for 
further details (accessed 25 July 2003)  
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3.5.3 “In… possession or control” 
The term “in the person’s possession or control” in Article 16(2) refers to information 
that already exists, and that the person in question has access to it or owns the 
information. It may be data stored at the person’s computer, or at another location (at 
work) but where the person in speak controls access to it. A question is when traffic data 
exist in a country, or a person has access to it. Multi-national service providers may 
have established centralized systems abroad, and the communication data could be 
transferred hereto.62 The question will not be elaborated further here. The Explanatory 
Report suggests in para 173 that the term “possession or control” refers to physical 
possession of the data concerned, and situations in which the data to be produced is 
outside the person’s physical possession but the person can nonetheless freely control 
production of the data (for example at a remote storage facility provided by another 
company.  
3.5.4 Preservation period 
The preserved data may be stored for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a 
maximum of 90 days (Article 16(2)). Within this period the police must have achieved 
the necessary authorizations to access the information. A Party may provide for the 
period to be renewed, if necessary. The Convention does not give any guidance on how 
many periods the renewal may be granted, and leaves it for national legislation to 
decide. Important to note, the Convention gives no guidance as to what happens with 
the preserved data after the storage period, if no authorization to access the data has 
                                                 
62  Privacy laws may impact the transborder transfer of personal data. See, for example Directive 
95/46/EC Article 25; note the exemption in Article 26(1)(d). For further details, see Lee A. Bygrave, 
Data Protection – Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), pp. 79-84 
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been presented (i.e., if there exist an obligation to affirmatively delete the preserved 
data). 
3.5.5 Obligation of confidentiality 
Article 16(3) provides that the preserved data must be kept confidential, and leaves it up 
to domestic law to define the necessary legislative measures to ensure this. The 
obligation to keep data confidential is motivated by two reasons: 1) the privacy of the 
person(s) involved, and (2) to avoid that the data are destroyed or tampered with. The 
dual obligations to keep the data safe and secure and to maintain confidentiality of the 
fact that the preservation measure has been undertaken helps to protect the privacy of 
the data subject or of other persons who may be mentioned or identified in that data.63 
3.6 Article 17 – Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data  
Article 17 establish the requirements for Member States to make sure that traffic data 
will be preserved and partially disclosed, whether one or more service providers are 
involved in the communication.  The Article reads: 
1  Each Party shall adopt, in respect of traffic data that is to be preserved 
under Article 16, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to: 
 a ensure that such expeditious preservation of traffic data is available 
regardless of whether one or more service providers were involved in the 
transmission of that communication; and 
 b ensure the expeditious disclosure to the Party’s competent authority, 
or a person designated by that authority, of a sufficient amount of traffic data to 
enable the Party to identify the service providers and the path through which the 
communication was transmitted. 
 2 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to 
Articles 14 and 15. 
                                                 
63 Explanatory Report para 163 
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The purpose of the Article is to give law enforcement authorities a tool to determine the 
source and/ or the destination of the communication. This will enable the police to trace 
the origin of an offence, and follow the “electronic trail back to the person responsible 
through several service providers. 
The Article gives no guidance on how this is to be done. The Explanatory Report states 
that it is up to “…domestic law to determine means that is consistent with its legal and 
economic system”.64  The infrastructure for Internet does not normally provide an 
automated mechanism for identifying the true source. Therefore, investigators will often 
need to contact individually each service provider in the chain, to determine the source 
of the prior connection. 
3.6.1 Identifying different service providers 
The Explanatory Report suggests three different methods how expedited preservation 
and –disclosure may be achieved when more than service provider is involved in the 
communication: 
- Issue a separate order on each service provider 
- Obtain one single order that apply to all service providers 
- Require the service provider(s) to notify the next service provider in the 
chain 
As for the first, a separate order on each service provider would be the traditional 
procedure for seeking disclosure of the data. The drawback is that it may be time-
consuming.  
                                                 
64 Explanatory Report para 168 
  
 
 
     34 
 
 
One single order that applies to all service providers will be a lot faster, an important 
plus because the need to follow the track when it is “hot” and before data is deleted or 
altered.  
The most controversial suggestion, however, is to obtain an order that involves the 
participation of service providers. A service provider, that somehow has been linked to 
a criminal offence, would be served with and order to notice the next service provider in 
the chain of the existence and terms of the preservation order. The second service 
provider would identify and notice the next, and so on.  
The problem with the last alternative is that national laws are likely to require a judicial 
order to mandate preservation or disclosure of confidential data.65 Identifying the next 
service provider in chain will most probably involve disclosure of confidential 
information, such as personal information and traffic data related to users and 
subscribers. Within the EU area, privacy laws give extensive provisions on how 
personal data are to be processed.66 Such legislation does not apply to the area of crime 
control, but will have an effect in this matter when one (private) service provider reveals 
personal information of users to another (private) service provider.  
In my opinion, the preferable way would be for the law enforcement authorities to ask 
for this information.  
                                                 
65 In Norway, the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority give such authorization. See also 
Rt. 1999 s. 1944 (access to traffic data). 
66 See section 5.3 below 
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3.7 “Competent authority” 
3.7.1 Partial disclosure 
Article 17(1) (b) of the Convention provides that the expedited disclosure of sufficient 
information to identify the service providers can be justified to a “competent 
authority”67 while waiting for a judicial order to disclosure data to the law enforcement 
authorities. This implies, of course, that the “competent authority” has competence to 
evaluate what information that is relevant and sufficient in the particular case under 
investigation.  
3.7.2 Production order 
Article 18 provides instructions for Parties to enable their “competent authorities” to 
give orders of data preservation, while law enforcement authorities issue a search 
warrant. The implementation of such a “production order” will probably be beneficial to 
third party custodians of data, such as service providers, to relieve them of any 
contractual or non-contractual liability.68 
3.7.3 Link to subscriber data 
To be able to get data that are useful for law enforcement purposes, traffic data has to be 
possible to link to subscriber identity. The Explanatory Report explicitly states that the 
Article 18 should not be understood as to impose an obligation on service providers to 
keep record of their subscribers, and will not require service providers to ensure the 
correctness of such information.  
                                                 
67 In UK, an ”competent authority” could be any of the 1,039 public authorities authorised under the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – for which there is no comprehensive oversight in place  
68 Explanatory Report para 171 
  
 
 
     36 
 
 
Thus, a service provider is not obliged to register identity information of so-called 
prepaid cards for mobile telephone services.69 Nor is it obliged to verify the identity of 
the subscribers or to resist the use of pseudonyms by users of its services.70 The 
proportionality principle will also provide some flexibility in relation to the application 
of the measure, for instance in many States to exclude its application in insubstantial 
cases.71 
3.8 Mutual assistance regarding provisional measures 
Articles 29 and 30 provides for a mechanism at the international level equivalent to that 
provided for in Articles 16 and 17 for use at the national level.72 Preservation is a 
limited, provisional measure intended to take place much more rapidly than the 
traditional mutual assistance, which may take weeks or months. Article 29 specifies that 
preservation effected in response to a mutual assistance request “shall be for a period 
not less than 60 days in order to enable the requesting Party to submit a request for 
search or similar access, seizure or similar securing, or disclosure of data”.73 The reason 
is that traditional mutual assistance procedures are usually is time-consuming, and the 
provision ensures a minimum period of time for the requesting Party to issue a formal 
mutual assistance request seeking the disclosure of the data. Important to note, the 
Articles does not contain any guidance of the maximum allowed storage period. This 
could imply that the maximum period is 90 days in accordance with Articles 16 and 17, 
or that the question is left for national legislation. 
                                                 
69 In Norway, e.g. the service provider Netcom estimates that they have approximately 300.000 users that 
are unknown, because any subscriber data has not been registered. 
70 Explanatory Report para 181 
71 Explanatory Report para 174 
72 Explanatory Report para 282 
73 Explanatory Report para 162 
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Where the requested Party believes that preservation will not ensure the availability of 
data, it shall promptly inform the requesting Party, which shall then determine whether 
the request should nevertheless be executed – Article 29(6).  
According to Article 30 (2), disclosure of data may only be withheld if the request 
concerns an offence that the Party, to whom the request was made considers a political 
offence, or the execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, 
ordre public or other essential interests. The Explanatory Report (para 291) states that 
the grounds for refusal are to be strictly limited, because this type of information is so 
crucial in identifying the perpetrators.74 
3.9 Summary 
In sum, this means that the Cybercrime Convention provides only for power to preserve 
data; pending subsequent disclosure of data to other legal power. This is limited to 
specific criminal investigations in a particular case, and presupposes that data already 
exist. The Convention does not require contracting Parties to collect or store data as a 
routine matter for purposes outside their normal business practice.  
One of the primarily aims of the Convention is to achieve greater degree of 
harmonization of criminal laws of the Contracting Parties.75 Since the Convention is 
drafted at a general level and leaves many of the details and safeguards up to national 
law, contracting Parties will have a significant leeway when implementing the 
Convention. This may actually hamper the harmonization and lead to less certainty in 
the area of crime laws.  
                                                 
74 Article 26 enables a contracting party that possesses valuable information to forward it to another 
without prior request – “spontaneous information” – in certain situations. The article is derived from 
similar provisions in anti-corruption laws; see further Explanatory Report para 260-261. 
75 See the Preamble to the Convention and the Explanatory Report 
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The Convention aims at attracting the largest possible number of contracting Parties, as 
this will be essential to effectively fight cybercrime.  
4 Data preservation vs. data retention 
4.1 Is data preservation sufficient for law enforcement purposes? 
A major concern for law enforcement authorities76 is whether the preservation 
requirement will be sufficient to investigate and computer-related crime. There exist 
several reasons for this: First, data protection laws restricts the amount of data that can 
be stored, and require personal data to be deleted unless otherwise explicitly required by 
national laws. The principles of data protection laws prohibit service providers to keep 
personal data on the sole basis of potential further need expressed by law enforcement 
authorities.77 Second, service providers tend to store less and less data, because of flat 
rate schemes or prepaid payment methods.78  Third, those service providers that keep 
billing data rarely need to keep them for more than 3 months for business reasons. Some 
service providers even delete data after 24 hours. The term of the actual retention is 
often deemed to be to short to combat certain types of crimes.  
                                                 
76 The following presentation is based on a subset of statements of UK law enforcement, available at 
http://www.apig.org.uk/lea.pdf and http://www.apc.org/english/righsts/europe/eu/data_protection.html 
(accessed 25 July 2003), Inger Marie Sunde: “Convention on cybercrime”, Tidsskrift for strafferett 
1/2002, and Allitsch, p. 161 (on law enforcement views), as these probably represents opinions that are 
common in the law enforcement community. 
77 See further section 5.3 below 
78 The price charged for a communication is becoming less and less dependent on distance and 
destination, there is no longer any need to store traffic data for billing purposes 
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It takes, due to judicial difficulties, quite some time to discover the source of the attack. 
And, anonymous communication services79 will prevent data from being available for 
law enforcement authorities.  
All of the above may slow police work down, as valuable evidence may be destroyed. 
There is a fear that organized crime may exploit the opportunities of lack of such data as 
evidence, and take advantage of the weaknesses in the “trace route” to distance 
themselves from law enforcement. Traffic data can often be the only opportunity to 
trace criminals in a networked environment. It is therefore essential to ensure that 
relevant data exist to be accessed. From a police point of view, traffic data logs are 
necessary, and it is desirable that such logs are stored as long as they can be to any use 
in crime investigation. This is crucial for law enforcement, not only for safeguarding 
national security (i.e. against terrorism) but also to the detection of volume crime at the 
lower level. 
4.2 Different concerns to be taken into account 
Luc Beirens, Head of The Federal Computer Crime Unit of the Federal Police in 
Belgium, says that the destruction of traffic data “would have the same effect as wiping 
out all fingerprints and bloodstreams in the scene of a bloody murder before any police 
investigation could start”.80 At the other side, privacy interest groups81 claim, “The 
traffic data of the whole population of the EU (and the countries joining) is to be held 
on record. It is a move from targeted surveillance to potentially universally 
surveillance”  
                                                 
79 See section 5.4 below 
80 Statement made at the EU Forum on Cybercrime in Brussels; quoted by Allitsch, p. 161  
81 Statewatch 12 no 3 / 4 May-July 2002, see www.statewatch.org for more information (accessed 25 July 
2003) 
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In other words, there are quite different interests at stake: 1) law enforcement authorities 
have stated that they consider the retention of a minimum of traffic data for a minimum 
period of time necessary to facilitate criminal investigations, 82 2) privacy interest 
groups and data protection authorities fear that mandatory data retention will lead to 
excessive surveillance and potential misuse, and 3) the service providers fear that 
mandatory retention of traffic data will be unreasonably costly, in addition to hampering 
the development of the information society. Several industry associations have 
participated in the ongoing debate and made common statements.83 This will be further 
dealt with in Chapter 8 below.  
4.3 Mandatory retention of traffic data 
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the law enforcement authorities increased 
the pressure on governments to adopt mandatory data retention requirements to fight 
terrorism. Several countries, such as e.g. Denmark (see section 7.1 below) have 
introduced such laws as a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington.  
                                                 
82 EU COM (2000) 890 final on Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of 
Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-Related Crime, Brussels, 2 January 2001, available 
at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/internetpoliciessite/crime/crimecommEN.html (accessed 25 July 2003) 
83 See for example “Common Industry Statement on Storage of Traffic Data for Law Enforcement 
Purposes” of 4 June 2003 by ICC, UNICE, EICTA and INTUG, available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/menu_electronic_business.asp or “Communications Data: Report of an 
Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group” of January 2003, available at www.apig.org.uk/APIGreport.pdf 
(accessed 25 July 2003) 
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The Belgian government drafted (and circulated for comment) in 2002 a Framework 
Decision on the retention of traffic data and access for the law enforcement 
authorities.84  
The Draft Framework Decision was supposed to be a binding measure on all EU 
member states. The reasoning was that effective investigation and surveillance would 
break down if not all countries allow data retention and subsequent access to the data by 
law enforcement authorities. The Draft Framework Decision proposed that data should 
be retained for 12 to 24 months.85 The police would still need a judicial order for access 
to the data. The Draft Framework Decision defined traffic data as “all data processed 
which relate to the routing of a communication by an electronic communications 
network” (Article 1(a)). The definition is very broad, as it would apply to all data in 
relation to land and mobile telephones and Internet connections. No necessity criterion 
is included in the definition. The Decision would apply to criminal investigation in 
general, and not limited to terrorism or other serious crimes.  
The Draft Framework Decision is not an official document, but was leaked to 
Statewatch, that published it along with much critical commentary.  
4.4 Opinion of the European Data Protection Commissioners 
The European Data Protection Commissioners has warned about the possible lack of 
legitimacy and legality of mandatory data retention for law enforcement purposes. 
Traffic data reveal enough information to analyze the personal and social relationship 
                                                 
84 “Surveillance of Communications: data retention to be ‘compulsory’ for 12-24 months”, Statewatch 
analysis no 11, May 2002, full text of the Framework Decision is available at 
www.statewatch.org/neww/2002/aug/05datafd1.htm (accessed 25 July 2003) 
85 A substantial longer period of time than the maximum of 90 days in Article 16 of the Cybercrime 
Convention, cf. Peter Blume, “Overvågning af og i cyberspace”, Fra rådet til tinget, No. 166 (2002) 
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and the use of media of a given person. Aggregation of such information over a longer 
term allows the compilation of a profile.86  The Commissioners emphasize that such 
retention will be an improper invasion of the fundamental rights guaranteed to 
individuals be Article 8 of ECHR. Retention of traffic data for purposes of law 
enforcement should meet strict conditions, i.e. only on a case-by-case basis for a limited 
period and when necessary, appropriate and proportionate in a democratic society. At 
the International Conference in Cardiff (9-11 September 2002), 87 the Commissioners 
made a common statement on mandatory data retention: 
“Where traffic data are to be retained in specific cases, there must therefore be a 
demonstrable need, the period of retention must be as short as possible and the 
practice must be clearly regulated by law, in a way that provides sufficient 
safeguards against unlawful access and other abuse. Systematic retention of all 
kinds of traffic data for a period of one year or more would be clearly 
disproportionate and therefore unacceptable in any case.”  
The Commissioners were also worried about the costs involved, and noted the absence 
of any similar measures in the United States - a telling observation since the idea stems 
from post 11 September 2001 "terrorism investigation requirements". 
4.5 Privacy issues 
The purpose of Article 15 of the Cybercrime Convention is to balance data preservation 
requirements with the protection of human rights and liberties. However, data retention 
requirements are not addresses in the Convention. Data retention and subsequent access 
to that data is a complex topic. 
                                                 
86 Allitsch, p. 164 
87 Statement of the European Data Protection Commissioners 11 September 2002, published at the 
website of Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR), available at 
http://www.fipr.org/press/020911DataCommissioners.html (accessed 25 July 2003)  
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The debate recently has therefore been whether the requirements of data retention are 
compatible with privacy laws. Privacy spokespersons and the police tend to have very 
different views on how the law should be. As quoted above, the European Data 
Protection Commissioners find that data retention by service providers would be an 
improper invasion of the fundamental rights guaranteed to individuals by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
The Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC), a coalition of 60 liberties groups, 
organized in 2002 a campaign against data retention.88 More than 16,000 individuals 
from 73 countries endorsed it in a matter of days. In an open letter to Pat Cox, President 
of the European Parliament 22 May 2002 it is opined that: “While the fight against 
terrorism is a legitimate purpose, we do not believe it can justify actions that undermine 
one of the most fundamental rights of democratic states.[..] New retention requirements 
[…] will create new risks to personal privacy, political freedom, freedom of speech, and 
public safety.[…]. Wide data retention powers for law enforcement authorities, 
especially if they were used on a routine basis and on a large part of the population, 
could have disastrous consequences for the most sensitive and confidential types of 
personal data.” If such a general power were enacted into law, it would amount, for 
many privacy law experts, to a blatant violation of the fundamental rights of 
presumption of innocence, privacy, freedom of expression, and secrecy of 
communications. 
The most central privacy related issues with regards to data preservation and data 
retention will be highlighted below. 
                                                 
88 April-May 2002 Campaign against data retention: Open letter to Pat Cox, President of the European 
Parliament 22 May 2002. Available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/data_retention.html#humanrights 
(accessed 25 July 2003) 
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5 Relation to privacy laws 
5.1 The right to privacy 
To my knowledge, the term “privacy” is not clearly defined in any data protection law,89 
but judicial theory has traditionally defined the concept in different ways. 90 Definitions 
of privacy vary widely according to to context and environment. Privacy is seen as an 
important right in a democratic society, to encourage individuals to participate in 
political and social life and thereby ensure a diversity of opinion and lifestyles.91 It has 
also been used as a protection for the individual against potential misuse and excessive 
control by public administration.92  
                                                 
89 Article 1(1) of Directive 95/46/EC instructs the member states to “protect the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy…”. The object of CoE Convention on 
data protection89 is formulated in similar ways. Recital 10 of the Directive 95/46/EC elaborates the 
concept of privacy as that “which is recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of Community 
law”. 
90 See further Bygrave, Data Protection Law – Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, p. 125, and 
Electronic Privacy Information Centre, “Privacy and Human Rights 2002 – An International Survey of 
Privacy Laws and Developments” (Washington DC, 2002), available at 
www.privacy.org/pi/survey/phr2002/phr2002-part1.pdf  (accessed 25 July 2003) 
91 Bygrave, Data Protection Law – Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, p 135 
92 See section 5.2.2 below 
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5.2 Human Rights Conventions93 
5.2.1 General 
The right to privacy is set out in several human rights conventions, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950.94 
5.2.2 Article 8 of ECHR 
Article 8 of ECHR protects the individual against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities in his private or family life, including his correspondence.95 Exemptions are 
made if the interference is “…in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well being of the country, for the prevention or disorder of crime….”, Article 8(2). 
Much of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) pursuant to 
Article 8 concerns surveillance activities by police or state agencies. Leading cases are 
Klass and Others v Germany96 and Malone v. United Kingdom.97 It may be concluded 
                                                 
93 See further Bygrave, “Data protection pursuant to the right of privacy in Human Rights Treaties” 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 1998, Volume 6, pp. 247-284 
94 See also The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM) of 1948, the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) of 1969. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
(ACHPR) of 1981 is the only convention without an express protection for privacy.  
95 Cf. Art 12 of UDHR, Art 17 of the ICCPR, art V of the ADRDM and Art 11 of the ACHR 
96 ECtHR Judgment in the case of Klass and others v. Germany, A28, 06/09/1978, as referred to in 
Bygrave, “Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in human Rights Treaties” p. 9 
97 ECtHR Judgment in the case of Malone v. United Kingdom, A82, 02/08/1984, as referred to in 
Bygrave, “Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in human Rights Treaties” p. 9 
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from case law that interception of a person’s communication constitutes an interference 
with the person’s right under Art 8(1), but the interference may be justified under 
Article 8(2) if three cumulative conditions are justified: a) the interference must be in 
accordance with the law, b) it must be necessary in a democratic society; c) and in the 
interest of national security or public safety, for the purposes specified in Art 8(2). 
Data retention requirements for crime prevention purposes would involve the routine 
collection and storage of traffic data on a large part of the population, by private 
entities. Since today’s traffic data (cf. Annex I) have the potential to generate extensive 
information of individuals, it has been argued that the retention of traffic data in any 
case should be considered as interference with the private life in the sense of Article 8 
ECHR.98 
However, any legislative measure at national level that may provide for the retention of 
traffic data for law enforcement purposes would need to fulfill the conditions as listed 
above. In this context it can be assumed that condition c) above is fulfilled, i.e. for the 
purpose of crime prevention.99 The condition of “in accordance with the law” has been 
interpreted to not necessarily require any legislative authority; however the authority 
must though satisfy typical “rule-of-law” principles like forseeability, clarity and non-
arbitrariness.100 
                                                 
98 Allitsch, p. 166  
99 However, the measure implemented to prevent crime must be proportional to the aim pursued. I.e., if 
there exist less intrusive means, these will prevail.  
100 See further Bygrave, “Data protection pursuant to the right of privacy in Human Rights Treaties”, pp. 
247-284 
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Necessity in a democratic society “corresponds to a pressing social need” and is 
“proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.101 These phrases are very vague, and 
their meaning would probably change during time and within different cultures. 
However, the proportionality assessment varies according to 1) the gravity of the 
interference, 2) the sensitivity of the information and 3) the safeguards implemented. 
"States may not…, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt 
whatever measures they deem appropriate… the danger (is that) of undermining or even 
destroying democracy on the ground of defending it", see Klass (A28).  
Applied to data retention, the “necessity” criteria and Article 8 case law has been 
interpreted to imply that the public authorities may only have access to traffic data on a 
case-by case basis, and never proactively as a general rule.102 
5.3 Data Protection laws 
5.3.1 General 
The right to privacy is pursued in data protection laws. One of the most important legal 
instruments is the Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individuals with 
regard to processing of personal data.103 It is the sole international, legally binding 
treaty dealing with data protection.104  
                                                 
101 See ECtHR Judgment in the case of Leander (Fn 29) para 58, available at 
http://www.menneskeret.dk/menneskeretieuropa/konventionen/baggrund/domme/ref00000104/ (accessed 
25 July 2003) 
102 Allitsch p. 166 
103 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data (ETS No. 108), Strasbourg 28 January 1981 
104 Bygrave, Data Protection Law- Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limit, p. 32 
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Within EU, Directive 95/46/EC105 provides comprehensive regulations for the 
processing for personal data. Also worth mentioning is the OECD Guidelines106 
governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, and the UN 
Guidelines107 concerning computerized personal data files. They are not legally binding 
(cf. the word “guidelines”) but serve as models and are highly influential in non-
European jurisdictions.108  
5.3.2 Data protection principles109 
The above-mentioned instruments establish certain principles on how processing of 
personal data are to be carried out.  Some of the principles are particular relevant in the 
context of data retention: 
5.3.2.1 Principle of fair and lawful processing 
Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be “obtained and processed fairly 
and lawfully”, CoE Convention Article 5(a), cf. Directive 95/46/EC Art 6(1)(a), UN 
Guidelines principle 1 and OECD Guidelines para 8.  
                                                 
105 See further section 5.3.3 below 
106 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Recommendation of the council 
concerning guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, 23 
September 1980 
107 United Nations (UN) Guidelines concerning computerized personal data files, 14 December 1990,  
108 E.g. Japan and North-America, cf. Bygrave 
109 For further elaboration of data protection principles, see Bygrave, Data Protection Law - Approaching 
Its Rationale, Logic and Limits. Bygrave lists the core principles of data protection laws as: Fair and 
lawful processing, Minimality, Purpose specification, Information Quality, Data subject participation and 
control, Disclosure limitation, Information security and Sensitivity. 
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Applied to data retention, this means that the laws need to specify clearly what types of 
data that are allowed to be retained, for how long and by whom.  
5.3.2.2 Principle of Minimality 
Personal data must be “…adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected” (Article 6(1)(c) of the Data Protection Directive). 
This is often referred to as the principle of minimality. Articles 7 and 8 of the Directive 
also promote minimality of data collected and processed, and similar provisions is 
found in CoE Convention on data protection Article 5(d), OECD Guidelines para 8 and 
UN Guidelines principle 2. According to sector-specific regulation within 
telecommunications, traffic data is only allowed to be stored for business purposes, such 
as billing and maintenance (see 5.3.3 below). The principle is recognized in the 
promotion of technical standards that allows for a minimality of data to be collected, 
(see 5.4 below). 
5.3.2.3 Principle of Purpose Specification 
Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (see Directive 95/46/EC, 
Article 6(b)). Similar provisions exist in CoE Convention Art 5(6), OECD Guidelines 
para 9 and UN Guidelines principle 3. When the service providers collect subscriber 
information for billing purposes, a disclosure to law enforcement authorities in crime 
investigations will consequently involve a repurposing of the use of the data.110 The 
data must not be kept in a form that permits identification after they no longer are 
necessary for the purposes the data where collected (Article 6(1)(e)).  
                                                 
110 However, the data protection directive does not apply to the areas of criminal law, see Article 3(2) cf. 
recital 13.   
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This principle is also present in CoE Convention Article 5(e) and as a “use limitation” 
principle in OECD Guidelines. Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC states that traffic 
data must be deleted when they are no longer needed for billing. 
 
5.3.3 EU Directives on Privacy 
5.3.3.1 General 
In the European Union, Directive 95/46/EC provides for the harmonization of the 
national legislation of the member states required to ensure an equivalent level of 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and in particular the right to privacy with 
respect to processing of personal data and to ensure the free movement of such data 
within the Community.111  
In 1997, the European Union supplemented the general Directive 95/56/EC with the 
more specific Directive 97/66/EC in the telecommunication sector. This directive will 
by the end of 2003112 be replaced by Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic sector. The new directive is 
supposed to strengthen privacy rights for individuals by extending the protections that 
where already in place for telecommunications to a broader, more technology-neutral 
category of “electronic communications”.113 
                                                 
111 Recital 10 of Directive 95/46/EC 
112 In Norway, the directive will be implemented by the new Ekom Act  
113 Recital 4 of Directive 2002/58/EC 
  
 
 
     51 
 
 
The Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention discusses the relation to the data 
protection directives in para 154: 
“These directives establish the obligation to delete data as soon as its storage is 
no longer necessary. However, Member States may adopt legislation to provide 
for exemptions when necessary for the purpose of the prevention, investigation or 
prosecution of criminal offences. These directives do not prevent Member States 
of the European Union from establishing powers and procedures under their 
domestic law to preserve specified data for specified investigations” (emphasis 
added).  
As discussed above (section 3.4.1), the Cybercrime Convention aims for a minimum 
level of legal protection and procedures recognized in national laws (e.g. data 
preservation), and do not contain any prohibition for countries to impose additional 
requirements under their legal system (e.g. data retention). The Explanatory Report does 
not comment on whether the privacy directives would prevent the member states to 
require systematically retention of traffic data.  
5.3.3.2 Obligation to delete data 
Directive 97/66/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC establish the obligation to delete certain 
types of data, such as personal data, if there is no longer a business purpose for the 
retention of the data.  
Article 6 (1) of Directive 97/66/EC reads: 
“Traffic data relating to subscribers and users processed to establish calls and 
stored by the provider of a public telecommunications network and/ or publicly 
available telecommunication service must be erased or made anonymous upon 
termination of the call without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 2,3 and 
4.” (Emphasis added) 
The Article requires that the data should be deleted once it is no longer required for the 
purpose for which it was collected. Article 14(1) allows member states to restrict the 
scope of obligations provided for in Article 6 when such a restriction constitutes a 
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necessary measure to safeguard national security and for the prevention, investigation 
and prosecutions of criminal offences as referred to in Article 13(1) of Directive 
95/46/EC. 
Article 6 of Directive 2002/58/EC carries on the obligation to delete data from Directive 
97/66/EC. The directive was supposed to be an uncontroversial update of the existing 
directive, but following the events of 11 September 2001 the question of mandatory 
data retention came up. Data retention was subject of a lengthy debate, but was left to 
the member states to decide after certain safeguards were fulfilled. 
Recital 26 provides that data relating to subscribers may only be stored ”...to the extent 
necessary for the provision of the service for the purpose of billing and for 
interconnection payments, and for a limited time”. This implies that data should be 
stored for a limited period only and not routinely held for extensive periods. 
Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC reads: 
“Traffic data relating to subscribers and users processed to establish calls and 
stored by the provider of a public communications network or publicly available 
electronic communication service must be erased or made anonymous when it is 
no longer needed for the purpose of the transmission of a communication 
without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 2,3 and 5 of this Article and 
Article 15(1).” (Emphasis added) 
Article 15(1) expressly provides that a member state may derogate from Article 6  
“when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure 
within a democratic society to safeguard… the prevention, investigation, defection and 
prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorized use of the electronic 
communications system…”114  
                                                 
114 Cf. Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC 
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This allows member states to restrict the scope of the obligation to delete data by 
introducing new laws mandating data retention. The data that can be retained includes 
catalogues of web sites visited, records of e-mail recipients, lists of telephone numbers 
dialed (“traffic data”), and the geographical location of the user by fixed or mobile 
phones (“location data”) (Art 2(b) and (c) of Dir. 2002/58/EC).  
5.3.3.3 Confidentiality of the communication 
In European Union, there is a general principle of confidentiality of communications 
(and related traffic data). Interceptions are illegal, unless law when necessary in specific 
cases, authorizes them for limited purposes. This follows from Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and the above-mentioned data protection directives. 
Illegal interception is established as an offence under Article 3 in the Cybercrime 
Convention, and applies in principle to all forms of data transfer, whether by telephone, 
fax, e-mail or file transfer.115 It represents the same violation of privacy of 
communications as traditional tapping and recording of oral telephone conversation 
between persons. Article 5 of Directives 97/66/EC and 2002/58/EC establishes a duty 
for member states to ensure the confidentiality of communication, and prohibit 
“listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception….” (emphasis added) except 
when legally authorized. Since today’s communication data may contain indicators of 
content, i.e. web sites visited etc., mandatory data retention could in some situations be 
a threat to the confidentiality of communication.  
                                                 
115 Explanatory Report para 51 
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5.3.4 Summary 
In sum, the data protection directives establish a duty to delete data no longer needed for 
business purposes. However, the directives do not apply in the field of crime law, and 
member states may therefore introduce new laws of mandatory data retention.  
However, any legislative measure at national level that may provide for the retention of 
traffic data for law enforcement purposes need to fulfill certain conditions: the proposed 
measures need to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate, as required by 
Community law and international law, including Directive 97/66/EC and 95/46/EC, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights of 4 November 1950 and the 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981. This is particularly relevant 
for measures that would involve the routine retention of data on a large part of the 
population.116 
5.4 Anonymisation services 
Several initiatives have been introduced to promote privacy and anonymity in 
cyberspace. One initiative is the development of privacy enhancing technologies 
(PETs), which promote technical standards that allows for a minimality of data to be 
collected.117 This has fundament in several EU directives: 
The Universal Services Directive (Directive 2002/22/EC) provides in Article 10, cf. 
Annex I part A (c) that Member States shall provide mechanisms for pre-payment118 
                                                 
116 EU COM (2000) 890 final: Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of 
Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime 
117 Examples of PETs are encryption, pre-paid phone cards, anonymisation software etc. 
118 Examples of pre-payment methods are phone-cards, flat-rate subscriptions, phone box etc. 
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methods for telephone services. With such a requirement, there is no business reason for 
service provider to keep subscriber data or traffic data for billing purposes. That means, 
when law enforcement authorities need traffic data to investigate a crime, no such data 
exists. Even if the directive specifies this applies to “telephone” services, the service 
providers already offer pre-payment methods or flat rate services for communication in 
general. Broadband connections frequently use this billing method.  
The German Teleservices Data Protection Act of 22 July, 1997119 explicitly states in 
Section 4(6) that the provider shall make it possible for the user to utilize and pay for 
teleservices anonymously or under a pseudonym it this is technically possible and can 
be accomplished at reasonable effort. The user shall be informed of this possibility. 
Recital 30 of the Directive 2002/58/EC includes similar statements: System for the 
provision of electronic communication networks and services should be designed to 
limit the amount of personal data necessary to a strict minimum. Any activities related 
to the provision of the electronic communications service that go beyond the 
transmission of a communication and the billing thereof should be based on aggregated, 
traffic data that cannot be related to subscribers or users. Recital 33 of the Directive 
follows up with “…in order to preserve the privacy of the user, Member States should 
encourage the development of electronic communication service options such as 
alternative payment facilities which allow anonymous or strictly private access to 
publicly available electronic communications services, for example calling cards and 
facilities for payment by credit cards.” 
                                                 
119 Act of the Protection of Personal Data Used in Teleservices (Teleservices Data Protection Act – 
Teledienstedatenschutzgesetz TDDSG) of 22 July, 1997, amended last by Article 3 of the bill on legal 
framework conditions for electronic commerce 
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There exist several services on the Internet that offers anonymous surfing,120 by use of 
proxy servers121 or software that promotes anonymity.122 The deployment of such 
services is suitable for those worried about their privacy, and also for criminals that do 
not want to be traced by the police.  Law enforcement experts have expressed concern 
that anonymity may result in non-accountability and could seriously impede the 
possibility to catch certain criminals.  
6 Relation to the E-Commerce Directive 
6.1 General 
The development of the information society is believed to be a key factor to ensure 
economic and social growth in Europe. It is a policy goal to take full advantage of e-
commerce to achieve full impact of the internal market and free movements of goods, 
people, services and capital.123 However, realizing that this goal may be hampered by 
divergences in legislation and from legal uncertainty as to which national rules apply to 
                                                 
120 Examples of websites that offers anonymous search are www.safeproxy.org and www.jupe.dk 
(accessed 25 July 2003) 
121 A proxy server is a kind of buffer between the computer and the Internet resources the user are 
accessing (e.g. web sites). The data the user request comes to the proxy first, and only then transfers the 
data to the user. If a proxy sits between the user and the Internet all of the users appear to come from one 
computer. In these cases, users can only be traced as far as the proxy unless additional information is 
known. 
122 Anonymisation software are available from 30$ at www.anonymizer.com (accessed 25 July 2003) 
123 Recitals 1-5 of Directive 2000/31/EC 
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such services, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe has passed a 
Directive on E-commerce (Directive 2000/31/EC).  
It has been discussed to what extent service providers should be liable for illegal content 
and criminal offences committed through their servers and networks. It was not 
desirable to put to heavy restrictions and liability on the service providers as this may 
hamper the development of the information society. If the service providers are not 
willing to be exposed to such risks, the information society will suffer. The directive 
therefore provides certain “safe harbors” from liability for service providers.  
A study on the legal issues relevant to combating criminal activities perpetrated through 
electronic communications,124 points at the fact that systematic storage of 
communications content by a service provider has potential contractual liability 
implications towards subscribers. The potential liability of service providers arising 
from data retention practices should be limited,125 and any data retention measure 
therefore needs to be well founded in law to avoid contractual liability.  
Two of the Articles are particularly interesting in relation to the duty to preserve data 
under the Cybercrime Convention, and will be discussed below. 
6.2 Liability of intermediary service providers  
Directive 2000/31/EC provides exemptions from liability where the service providers 
only performs certain necessary acts in the communications process; mere conduit 
(Article 12), caching (Article 13) and hosting (Article 14). The service providers have 
                                                 
124 The Computer Related Crime Research Unit, “Study on the legal issues relevant to combating criminal 
activities perpetrated through electronic communications – Final Report” (London, 2000), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/internetpoliciessite/crime/study2000/cover.html (accessed 25 July 2003)  
125 G8 Report 
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no general obligation to monitor content or traffic (Article 15). The exceptions will only 
apply when the service provider acts as an intermediary in the communication process. 
6.2.1 Article 14 – Hosting 
Article 14 exempts service providers from liability if they does not have actual 
knowledge or are aware of facts and circumstances of illegal content or activities. The 
service provider has to act quickly to remove the information or disable access to it 
upon obtaining such knowledge126 to be able to escape liability.  
That means, if any electronic evidence is needed at a later stage (cf. Articles 16 and 17 
of the Cybercrime Convention), the information may already be deleted of the service 
provider to avoid liability.  
However, recital 46 of Directive 2000/31/EC gives the Member states the opportunity to 
“…establish specific requirements which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior to the 
removal or disabling of information”. Member states may therefore provide at national 
level that such data are preserved for a later investigation.127  
6.2.2 Article 15 – No general obligation to monitor 
Article 15 states that service providers shall have no obligation to monitor information 
they transmit or store, or to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal 
activity.128 The service providers are not obliged to investigate illegal activity 
                                                 
126 What constitutes actual “knowledge” may be subject for discussion, but will not be pursued here 
127 In EU, a procedure like “notice-and-takedown” like in the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) was rejected of several reasons. This will not be further dealt with here. 
128 This harmonizes with the Cybercrime Convention’s Explanatory Report that applies Article 16 on data 
that “already exits”, i.e. no obligation for the service providers to implement routines above what that 
they use in their normal business practices. 
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themselves, but leave this up to the law enforcement authorities. However, recital 48 of 
the directive establishes that Member States may impose a “duty of care, which can 
reasonably be expected of them and which is specified by national law, in order to 
detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities”. The duty of care is expected to 
consist of implementing and operating filtering and control mechanisms.129  
Article 15 (2) establishes that Member States may require that information society 
providers promptly inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities 
undertaken and at their request provide information that enables the identification of 
users. This may be contradictory compared to the provisions of the data protection 
directives: Recital 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC states that Directive 95/46/EC and 
Directive 97/66/EC are fully applicable to information society services, and that 
implementation of Directive 2000/31/EC should be made in full compliance with the 
principles relating to the protection of personal data. Recital 15 reaffirms that the 
confidentiality of communications is guaranteed by Article 5 of Directive 97/66/EC, 
and provides that Member States must prohibit any kind of interception or surveillance 
of communications by others than the senders and receivers, except when legally 
authorized.  
                                                 
129 Rosa Julia-Barcelo, “Liability for on-line intermediaries: comparing EU and US legal frameworks” in 
Unipub AS’, Required reading Part I, E-commerce law, Masters of Law (Oslo: Kopinor, 2003) p. 252. 
Barcelo ask whether this recital mean that Member States are entitled to impose monitoring obligations 
on service providers, but concludes that taking into account the existence of Article 15.1 and the fact that 
the monitoring statements are included in a recital rather than in the main text, it seems rather likely that 
the service providers will not be obliged to monitor content on a general basis. Service providers may also 
claim that given the vast amount of material placed on its servers, it is technically impossible for it to 
monitor the content of its servers. 
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6.3 Summary 
A potential conflict exists in the Cybercrime Convention’s requirements of expedited 
data preservation, and the obligations of “expeditiously” removing illegal content under 
Directive 2000/31/EC. Further guidance on how these provisions are to be understood 
would be desirable.  Divergence in legislation is a potential obstacle within the internal 
market for the growth of e-commerce; not to forget the hampering effect for cross-
border investigation of computer crimes. 
7 Current Practice  
7.1 Europe 
According to a survey by the European Council on traffic data retention,130 a majority of 
EU governments have or intend to introduce an obligation for the retention of traffic 
data, in case the information became of might prove useful in police or security service 
investigations. The norm for the period of data retention would appear to be 12 months, 
although Ireland is way put ahead with 3 years. 
Examples of countries that have already introduced such legislation, is e.g. Denmark 
and the UK. In Denmark, The Danish Administration of Justice Act was amended by 
Act No 378 of 6 June 2002 (the Anti-Terrorism Act of the Ministry of Justice). Section 
786 has been amended so that communications providers have to retain data for 12 
months. The UK Government introduced the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act in 
                                                 
130 Answers to questionnaire on traffic data retention, by Council of Europe 20 November 2002, available 
http://www.effi.org/sananvapaus/eu-2002-11-20.html (accessed 25 July 2003)  
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December 2001.131 The government had hoped to persuade UK service providers to 
introduce these measures voluntarily, but the service providers remained unconvinced 
by the government's arguments and concerned about costs.132  
The survey shows that governments across Europe are taking a similar line on data 
retention. Of the governments surveyed, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Portugal, and Sweden support the idea of a European instrument, with Belgium also 
backing the proposals. Finland supports data retention, proposing to set a two years 
period for mandatory data retention, while France underlines that data retention is now 
"authorized" after its adoption of Directive 2002/58/EC. The only countries expressing 
reservations are Germany and Austria. German authorities say that they need proof that 
the proposed European instrument is compatible with German constitutional law. 
7.2 USA 
The US Government seems to have favored a move towards a preservation regime 
instead for retention requirements.133 The reasoning has been that preserving data on an 
individual and identifiable suspect rather than historical data on all users offers at more 
balanced and proportionate solution. Law enforcement is provided with the evidence it 
needs without unduly impinging on citizens’ rights or imposing unnecessary costs on 
service providers.  In addition, the preservation approach preserves the important 
checks-and-balance system of judicial oversight of law enforcement activities. Rather 
                                                 
131 Anti-Terrorsim, Crime and Security Act 2001, available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm (accessed 25 July 2003) 
132 AGIP- Submission on behalf of UK Law Enforcement, available at http://www.apig.org.uk/lea.pdf 
(accessed 25 July 2003) 
133 See, 18. U.S.C. 2703, available on http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2703.htm, (accessed 
25 July 2003)  
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than assuming everyone is possibly guilty, law enforcement is only able to obtain 
information based on specific evidence (suspicion) that a crime may have been 
committed.  The government has in September 2002 launched a National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace,134 which contains 5 national priorities including a National 
Cyberspace Security Response system that are planned to improve response to cyber 
incidents and reduce potential damages from such events.  
8 Discussion topics 
8.1 Privacy or security – a policy dilemma 
Mandatory data retention is currently a dilemma for governments and policy makers. 
On the one hand, protection of privacy is essential if the right to anonymity and freedom 
of expression are to be maintained online. On the other hand, the right to privacy may 
cause security risks if the police are left without traces of criminal behavior. If there is 
given a right to anonymity for privacy reasons, this will also apply to criminals and 
thereby shield them from investigation and prosecution.  
Protection of privacy has been a key policy objective in the European Union.135 
However, privacy is not an absolute right. The needs of the society as a whole must 
prevail. Independent of the individual’s right to privacy, the question that must be 
                                                 
134 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/ (accessed 25 
July 2003) 
135 The European Parliament is sensitive to privacy issues and has generally taken a stance in favor of 
strong protection of personal data, cf. EU Forum on Cybercrime 
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discussed is whether it is desirable to have a society that keeps all its citizens under 
systematic surveillance.  
Mandatory data retention could lead to a high degree of surveillance, as all citizens’ 
private communication will be kept and stored for years. 136  There exist a certain fear 
that supply creates demand. As soon as comprehensive databases of the public’s 
communication or activities exist, the pressure to use them for purposes beyond those 
for which they were chartered will increase. The unknown effects and potential for 
misuse is worrisome. If particular patterns of behavior were highly correlated to 
criminal behavior then it might become possible for “fishing expeditions” to detect 
these patterns to be seen a proportionate action.137 
Thus, law enforcement authorities claim that communications data is becoming 
increasingly important to provide evidence to establish innocence. If such data is not 
available as evidence for prosecution or defense, this could lead to a miscarriage of 
justice. According to law enforcement authorities, this provides the overriding 
justification for longer-term retention.  
A phrase sometimes used is “only the guilty have anything to fear”. But critics point at 
the fact that it is not only law enforcement authorities or government that may pose a 
                                                 
136 See, for example, Denise T. Rice: “2001: A Cyberspace Odyssey through U.S. and EU Internet 
Jurisdiction”, PLI’s Fifth Annual Internet Law Institute, San Fransiciso, July 2001: All 30 of the ISPs in 
Saudi Arabia are linked to a ground floor room at the Riyadh Internet entranceway where all of the 
country’ web activity is stored in massive cache files and screened. Residents can circumvent government 
controls by connecting to the Web through foreign-based servers and through satellite phones or by using 
the file transfer protocol, but those methods require either money or some computer expertise. 
137 AGIP Report, quotation of Dr. Pounder, p. 8 
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threat to privacy: Traffic data are collected and stored by private service providers, with 
no prior authorization.138  
It is very difficult to conclude what the better solution to the dilemma would be. The 
impact of any measure must be carefully analyzed and compared with the effectiveness 
of such a measure in the fight against cybercrime. Adequate security of any retained 
traffic data would have to be ensured.139  
In my opinion, I personally would tend to favor a secure cyberspace even if this 
involves some sort of registration or data retention. I think this will be the only way to 
fight cybercrime, not necessary serious crime such as terrorism etc., but the lower level 
crime such as e.g. credit card fraud and child pornography. However, the dangers of an 
unwanted surveillance and control must not be neglected, and any measure should be 
subject for an extensive, public debate before it is introduced.  
8.2 What data are required? 
Important questions that need to be discussed are; what type of data should be retained 
for what reasons, for how long, and by whom? 
Privacy interest is generally considered to be less with respect to the collection of traffic 
data than interception of content data. Traffic data about time, duration and size of 
communication reveals little information of personal interests. However, a stronger 
privacy issue may exist in regard to data about the source or destination of a 
communication (e.g. visited websites).  This means that mandatory data retention 
                                                 
138 See, Peter Blume, “Overvågning af og i cyberspace”, Fra rådet til tinget, No. 166 (2002). Blume 
suggests that if data retention becomes mandatory, it might be appropriate to consider a further 
registration and approval of service providers. 
139 EU Forum on Cybercrime 
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requirements should only be applied to traffic data (and not content data). However, the 
distinctions between traffic- and content data are increasingly blurred, as discussed in 
2.7, and it is increasingly difficult to strictly separate the two concepts of data.  
There is a need to reach a common consensus for what purposes and to what extent 
particular types of traffic data may be generated, collected, stored, and for what 
purposes they might be further used. Further guidance and legislation on the issue 
would be desirable. 
8.2.1 A new definition of traffic data 
Important to note, the “traffic data” definition in Article 1(d) of the Cybercrime 
Convention does not contain any “necessity” criteria.  The definition also differs from 
the definition of “traffic data” in Directive 2002/58/EC, Article 2(b).  Given the wide 
(and different) definitions of traffic data, I think a new definition of traffic data – narrow 
and precise – is necessary. If not, there will probably be much uncertainty attached to 
what data are allowed, or required, to process and store. A new definition should be 
restricted to what data is necessary for the purposes for why they are collected, and the 
level of sensitivity of the data. This way, the distinction between traffic-, content- and 
location data could perhaps be avoided. If possible, effort should be made to define the 
necessary data and measures that do not involve overlapping storage of data, or the 
storage of excessive data.  
8.2.2 Is there a need for a common measure throughout Europe? 
If data retention practices are left to national laws, or service providers on a voluntarily 
basis, the risk is significant divergence between member states. The differing retention 
practices and access provisions could make police work more difficult. A survey 
conducted by the Council of Europe (see section 7.1 above) shows that a majority of 
governments within EU is supportive of a proposal of mandatory data retention and a 
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common legal structure.  However, the law enforcement authorities point out that they 
can not wait for this to happen, and urges progress in national legislation in the 
meantime.140 
8.3 Practical problems 
8.3.1 Costs 
There exists very little material on what the actual costs involved in data retention are. 
Questions still unanswered are; what are exactly the costs of mandatory data retention, 
what part of the process is most costly, who should bear the cost etc. Several figures 
have been presented, that varies significantly. 141 The government’s estimates are far 
below what the industry itself suggests. A survey conducted by the All Party Internet 
Group142 shows that this is due to the fact that the first mentioned take accounts of the 
cost of an access request, while the latter calculates the cost of storage, maintenance and 
accessibility of data.  
                                                 
140 Several cases have been used for justifying the need for this, see e.g. “Communications Data: Report 
of an Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group” of January 2003, available at 
www.apig.org.uk/APIGreport.pdf  (accessed 25 July 2003) 
141 See, e.g. Allitsch (p. 163) or All Party Internet Group (AGIP), “Communications Data – Report of an 
Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group” (p. 22): AOL, a large ISP operating at a global level, reported to 
AGIP that they processed 392 million user sessions a day, sending 597 million emails end estimated they 
would spend $40 million setting up a system and $14 million per annum running it. THUS plc estimated 
that within their business they could, at the upper end of what might be rquired, be looking at a five or six 
million pound project. When one considers the size of the rest of the ISP industry, let alone the fixed line 
and mobile telephone companies, the sums well in excess of £100 million might well turn out out to be 
necessary. All figures must bee seen as rought estimates. 
142 All Party Internet Group (AGIP), “Communications Data – Report of an Inquiry by the All Party 
Internet Group”, p. 22 
  
 
 
     67 
 
 
Some confusion arises because of doubt about exactly what must be stored for how 
long.143 If service providers keep data for 3-6 months anyway, would it be substantially 
more cumbersome or expensive to keep data for 12 or 24 months? What about 10 
years?144 To my knowledge, no affirmative or common agreed answers exist.  
Mandatory retention of traffic data for periods longer than business requires do not only 
magnifies costs, but also poses significant privacy and security risks by creating 
enormous pools of stored data, increasing the risk of illegal access to and misuse of this 
data. The data protection authorities will not have the capacity to effectively supervise 
the processing of personal data in such volumes.145 Governments and service providers 
would need to develop appropriate security measures, at additional cost. 146 
The Common Industry Statement147 opines that governments should bear the costs; 
“Requiring law enforcement authorities to bear the cost of access requests to the traffic 
data, they argue, will help to ensure that only strictly necessary requests for data are 
made, and will reduce public concern regarding the privacy implications of data storage. 
These safeguards will help ensure that the goals of the use of stored data are limited to 
what is in the public interest.” 148  
                                                 
143 Ibid. 
144 The latter could probably run into some technical questions, because data is not only to be stored, but 
should be readable after 10 years as well. This may cause problems because of e.g. new storage mediums 
and new software. 
145 Allitsch, p. 164 
146 Common Industry Statement, p. 8 
147 Common Industry Statement, p. 3 
148 Common Industry Statement, p. 8 
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Additional costs of data retention could be identified on the basis of data storage, 
security measures, request compliance and staff costs. 149 If the service providers are to 
bear this cost as a “cost of doing business” the cost will eventually be allocated to 
subscribers and may hamper the development of the Information Society. In addition, if 
everyone who is engaged in providing communication services is required to retain 
data, there will be a considerable overlap in storage and considerable unnecessary 
expense. In many cases, more than one provider may be required to save the same 
traffic data, e.g., an Internet Service Provider and an email provider. As crime detection 
is considered to be in the interest of the public and consequently a common good, it is 
considered that there is no justification for the cost being borne by the industry. 
In my opinion, further research on the different cost elements and cost-benefit analyses 
is urgently needed, and should be carried out by joint efforts of governments and the 
industry.  This should be done as soon as possible, and before any further legislation is 
introduced on the same issue. 
8.3.2 Technical requirements 
Significant concerns have been raised about the possible imposition of data retention 
requirements in respect of data not currently recorded in the normal course of the 
service provider’s business. The criticism against requirements of data retention are that 
the governments and law enforcement authorities often lacks the necessary in-depth 
technological knowledge of how retention and storage are carried out. The volume of 
data involved is also likely to be considerable and expanding at an exponential rate. 
Given the mass of data useful to retain could become increasingly difficult to identify 
and the potential amounts increasingly difficult to store and then interpret.  
                                                 
149 Allitsch, p. 163 
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If the different types of service providers would have to adhere to similar data retention 
policies, many of these would have to install entirely new systems to meet the retention 
requirements. This could be disproportional upon the smaller service providers.150  
The main question is therefore, is it practical to retain all communications data on the 
off chance that it will be useful one day? In my opinion, the answer will be probably 
not. As the industry itself put it, “There should not be imposed data storage requirement 
[on service providers] as this obligation would result in unreasonable high costs or 
technological impediments and would yield marginal benefits to law enforcement 
authorities.”151 I think further research is necessary to be able to answer this question 
affirmatively. 
8.3.3 Development of the Information Society 
The eEurope 2005 Action Plan152 aims to encourage more effective and efficient 
interaction between citizens, business and public administration. As much of the 
information exchanged can be of a personal or confidential nature (medical advise, 
financial transactions, legal etc),153 it is vital to ensure the security of such services. One 
of the policy goals of the Action Plan is to promote growth of e-business and thereby 
facilitate the creation of jobs and improve productivity.    
                                                 
150 “Communications Data: Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group” of January 2003, 
available at www.apig.org.uk/APIGreport.pdf (accessed 25 July 2003) 
151 Common Industry Statement on Storage of Traffic Data for Law Enforcement Purposes, 4 June 2003, 
available at www.eicta.org/dls/common/openFile.asp (accessed 25 July 2003) 
152 Communication from the Commission: eEurope 2005: An information society for all, 28 May 2002, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/news_library/eeurope2005/index_en.htm 
(accessed 25 July 2003) 
153 Examples are e-learning, e-government, e-health etc. 
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If traffic data storage will result in massive costs, this can in turn impact and hamper 
competition. The risk is that the threshold is too high for new entrants to the markets; 
smaller service providers will go broke; or new services will not be developed or 
offered. Large service providers would maybe prefer to establish their headquarters 
outside Europe in countries where data retention rules are less onerous.  Not only 
private communication, but also business communication would be subject to 
surveillance by mandatory data retention. Those companies worried about 
confidentiality of business communication (e.g., in cases of merger acquisitions etc) 
would maybe choose to use service providers established outside Europe. This will be 
harmful to the development of the Information Society.  
8.3.4 Requests from non-member countries 
There may be a certain risk that non-European Union law enforcement authorities will 
seek data held in Europe that it can not obtain at home, either because it was not 
retained or because their national law would no permit this kind of access.154 This could 
in practice mean that the requested country has to subsidize the cost of preservation and 
disclosure, to the benefit for foreign law enforcement agencies.  
                                                 
154  See Official Journal of Europe C 155 E/88 3 July 2003, written question E-3081/02 by Erik Meijer 
(GUE/NGL) to the Commission 28 October 2002: “Is it possible that, through the exchange of data with 
Europe, US judicial bodies are trying to obtain traffic data which would not be obtained under US 
legislation? Does the Commission find it acceptable that, through this circuitous European route, data 
can be gathered and stored for the benefit of a State which is not authorized to collect such data itself?”  
Answer by Mr Liikansen on behalf of the Commission 10 December 2002: “As suggested by the 
Honorable Member, the possibility exists that, through obligations imposed within the Union, American 
authorities get hold of traffic data that would otherwise not be available via their own legal system.” 
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The requesting country may be charged for any expenses of access and disclosure of 
data, but the storage cost for service providers – of information that might be requested 
sometime in the future – will not be recovered. There is also a policy question whether 
it is desirable that governments may obtain information of their citizens that are not 
available in their own country.   
8.4 Possible solutions 
8.4.1 Should anonymisation services be prohibited? 
If anonymisation services undermine police work, could one solution be the prohibition 
of such services,155 and instead promote the use of pseudonym services. This will grant 
he citizen “anonymity” in cyberspace, and at the same time provide the necessary data 
for law enforcement authorities when investigating crimes.  
However, this would require that all service providers keep record of their users and log 
communication traffic. 156 New legislation would be needed to accomplish this.  
8.4.2 Obligation to monitor and notify 
Would monitoring requirements be less intrusive to the service providers and provide 
the same results as mandatory data retention? If the service providers were obligated to 
install filters (e.g. to avoid and/ or report child pornography or racist material) the cost 
would probably be lower than massive data storage. The benefit is that the spread of 
illegal material would likely decrease, and the police would immediately gain 
                                                 
155 Note the very strong protection of digital rights management systems (DRMS) and prohibition of 
circumvention, Directive 2001/29/EC 
156 Inger Marie Sunde: ”IKT-kriminalitet: Etterforskningsmetoder og personvern” suggests to introduce a 
mandatory ”e-passport” that registers the identiy of the user when he or she accesses the Internet 
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knowledge of certain criminal offences.157 A mandatory requirement to employ 
electronic agents to detect illegal material would help the police to trace criminal 
offences, without the privacy concerns that mandatory data retention involves.   
In that case, certain articles of Directive 2000/31/EC (as described above) need to be 
rewritten, and additional legislation must be passed. 
8.4.3 Regulation similar in the financial markets 
The current situation of service providers has been compared to the former misuse of 
bank- and financial services for money laundering and illegal financial transactions.158 
Today, data sharing between financial institutions and government agencies has been 
introduced to increase surveillance of transactions, and there exists a notification 
obligation when financial institutions gain knowledge of illegal or irregular transactions.  
Law enforcement authorities have advocated similar legislation towards those providing 
communication services.159 
8.4.4 Data warehouses 
It has been suggested that if costs of data storage is to high, service providers should 
have the option to outsource retention to ”data warehouses” facilitated by government 
or a Trusted Third Party. 160 Such data warehouses could hold the data from several 
service providers in a single place, and take responsibility for storage, access and the 
                                                 
157 Though, mandatory data retention was required to prevent crimes like terrorism i.e., and the police will 
still need traffic data. Terrorism will not be “filtered” away. 
158 Inger Marie Sunde,: ”IKT-kriminalitet: Etterforskningsmetoder og Personvern”  and 
”Telekombransjens rolle i moderne kriminalitetsutvikling”  
159 Ibid. 
160 E.g., a private contractor or entity authorized by government and/ or consumer interest organizations 
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subsequent deletion of data. The Industry, however, thought that this would not be 
lawful or desirable, and Foundation for Information Policy Report (FIPR) has claimed 
that data warehouses are exactly the tools needed to create a totalitarian state.161 
A danger is that such warehouses could be attractive targets for hackers that wants data 
for totally different purposes that crime investigation.  
8.4.5 Suggestion of how to carry out mandatory data retention 
From the discussion above, it seems safe to conclude that everyone agrees with the 
following: 
- Fundamental human rights and freedoms must be secured 
- Every individual has a right to privacy 
- Victims of computer crime have a right to protection.162 
A possible solution could therefore be: 
- Requirement of data retention for a fixed period of time, of very clear and 
narrowly defined traffic data  
- Detailed description of the procedures for storage and maintenance 
- Access to stored traffic data should be restricted exclusively to law 
enforcement authorities for crime investigation purposes  
- Close evaluation of the measures over a period of 5 years, to ensure the 
requirements fulfils their purpose and does not jeopardize the privacy of 
individuals. Necessary adjustments or amendments may be made.  
In this way, consensus may be reached on the important issues of data preservation and 
data retention as a compromise between the different interests at stake. 
                                                 
161 Quoted in AGIP Report, p. 24 
162 G8 Report 
  
 
 
     74 
 
 
8.4.6 Fines 
An additional solution would be to impose fines for misuse of traffic data information. 
If law enforcement authorities use traffic data where the suspicion against a person is 
not correct, the person may claim damages. The fines should be quite high, to avoid any 
situations where data are misused, or used for other purposes than crime investigation 
and prosecution. This would ensure that the police get a judicial order for access to data 
in specific cases, and the service providers (or whoever stores the data, cf. data 
warehouses) need to control the access and that data is not used for other purposes by 
private entities.   
9 Concluding remarks 
Further analysis of the costs (i.e., both privacy costs and economic costs) and benefits of 
data retention would be preferrable. This includes the number of cases solved because 
of access to traffic data, and cases left unsolved due to lack of such data. Until reliable 
statistics of the current situations are available, it is difficult to conclude whether data 
retention should be made mandatory or not.   
Data retention is an intrusive measure that will impact both the individuals’ right to 
privacy and the development of the Information Society. The principle of 
proportionality calls for the less intrusive measure (i.e., data preservation) to be tried out 
first.  The Cybercrime Convention will ensure that contracting Parties implement 
preservation requirements in national laws. Only if the provisions of data preservation 
fail to be sufficient to the aim pursued, more intrusive measures such as data retention 
can be jusitified.  
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However, there is a demonstrable need for access to traffic data in crime investigations. 
The situation where no data is available because they are not registered (e.g., 
anonymous Internet surfing, flat rate billing) will not be solved by any preservation or 
retention requirements.  The issue needs to be addressed separately, and the need for 
new legislation in this area should be considered.  
Nobody wants cyber criminals to go unpunished. The challenge is to find the right 
balance between the different interests involved.   
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Annex I 
G8 Government-Private Sector High-Level Meeting On High-Tech Crime, Report for 
Workshop 1: Data Retention Potential Consequences for Data Retention of Various 
Business Models Characterizing Internet Service Providers, Tokyo, 22-24 May, 2001 
Appendix A to Report of Workshop 1a 
The following is a list of log details related to some services that may be available to an 
Internet service. It should be noted that the content of these logs might be subject to 
relevant business, technical and legal conditions; not all of the following data elements 
will be available in all logs.  
(1) Network Access Systems (NAS) 
- access logs specific to authentication and authorization servers such as TACACS+ or 
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial in User Service) used to control access to IP 
routers or network access servers.  
- date and time of connection of client to server1 
- userid 
- assigned IP address 
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- NAS IP address 
- Number of bytes transmitted and received 
- Caller Line Identification (CLI)2 
(2) Email servers 
- SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) log  
- date and time of connection of client to server 
   - IP address of sending computer 
   - Message ID (msgid) 
   - sender (login@domain); 
   - receiver (login@domain) 
   - status indicator 
POP (Post Office Protocol) log or IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) log  
- date and time of connection of client to server 
- IP address of client connected to server 
- Userid 
- In some cases identifying information of email retrieved 
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(3) File upload and download servers 
- FTP (File Transfer Protocol) log  
- date and time of connection of client to server 
- IP source address 
- userid 
- path and filename of data object uploaded or downloaded 
(4) Web servers 
- HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) log  
- date and time of connection of client to server 
- IP source address 
- operation (i.e., GET command) 
- path of the operation (to retrieve html page or image file) 
- "last visited page" 
- response codes 
(5) Usenet 
- NNTP (Network News Transfer Protocol) log  
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- date and time of connection of client to server 
- protocol process ID (nnrpd[NNN...N]) 
- hostname (DNS name of assigned dynamic IP address) 
- basic client activity (no content) 
- posted message ID 
(6) Internet Relay Chat 
- IRC log  
- date and time of connection of client to server 
- duration of session 
- nickname used during IRC connection 
- hostname and/or IP address 
(Note)  
1 Reliable time records among different computers and networks is essential for investigation and 
prosecution. The use of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) for synchronization should be an ISP Best 
Practice.  
2 CLI provides the number from which a telephone call is made and may or may not be available to ISPs. 
CLI retrieval is specific to the given combination of software and hardware. 
